The European Air Arms Race 1935 - 1939 part 2 of 2

Video Title :	The European Air Arms Race 1935 - 1939 part 2 of 2
Description :	France - It was in 1936 that the Luftwaffe overtook the French air force in terms of both quality and quantity. When the French premier visited London in November 1937, the British Prime Minister taxed him about the lamentable state of the French air force. A few months later, General Vullemin, France's Chief of Air Staff, warned the government that in a war the French air force would be destroyed in a few days. He kept up these warnings throughout the year, especially after a visit to Germany in 1938 from which he returned very impressed by the strength of the Luftwaffe (as he had been meant to be), When Daladier set off for Munich he was armed with a letter from Vuillemin warning him that France had no air force. Urgent improvements were obviously needed, and so in March 1938 the government decided to, give priority to air rearmament. In that year for the first time the Air Ministry took the largest proportion, of arms spending (42 per cent.) A new plan (Plan V) aimed nearly to double existing production, with the majority of (41 per cent) new planes being fighters and 34 per cent of them bombers. This change in priorities occurred largely because fighters were faster and cheaper to build (and because it was known that the British had bombers). But it was also the case that the French air force was moving away from its doctrinaire commitment to strategic bombing, and becoming more open to the idea of air--army cooperation. French observers had noted the effective way in which the German air force had been able to support land operations in the Spanish Civil War. The French air force, however, was slow to translate this into new operational doctrines. For example, nothing was done to produce dive bombers, which had been used in Spain to support offensive operations by ground troops. When the French air force thought in terms of cooperation with the army, its perspective was defensive: producing fighters to deny French air space to enemy aircraft. England - By Spring 1938, not a single production Spitfire, Wellington, Hampden, Bristol Beaufort, Boulton-Paul Defiant, Blackburn Skua or Westland Lysander were yet available to the RAF service units. The Blenheim, the Hurricane and the Whitley were only just coming into service.So even if industry had met its quota, there was no reason for the Air Ministry to rest satisfied. The programme was only just sufficient to enable the country to meet the German menace as it appeared at the beginning of 1936 and to match the plans of the Luftwaffe as they were known at that time. But in the meantime both the urgency of the German menace and German armament in the air had greatly grown. Throughout 1936, 1937 and 1938 the international situation moved towards a crisis by a series of successive stages: the occupations of the Rhineland, the Anschluss of Austria and the beginning of the Sudetenland agitation. All through this period Germany rearmed in the air at a constantly rising rate. At each sign of international trouble Germany's strength in the air had to be reassessed, and the Air Council kept putting forward demands for corresponding increases in the scale of British expansion. On the positive side, the RAF was the first to overcome the purely financial limits to its expansion, and its rate of growth was higher than that of the other Services. At frequent intervals between 1934 and 1939 the Air Staff assessed the German position more or less accurately and uttered warnings more or less audibly. The effect of the warnings on the Government was to make it well aware of the crucial importance of the air arm. Indeed, as time went on, the dangers of air attack and the overwhelming importance of air defence appeared if anything greater than the war was to prove them to be.
Views :	7006
Rating :	4.85
Keywords, Tags :	ww2 aviation history
Video Length :	10 : 7

Comments :

as late as 1937 My grandfather who later was to become a Reuters war correspondent was told to fabricate stories about dummy German tanks & aeroplanes, despite him having interviewed Goebbels in 1935 and being left in no doubt as to German intentions. There was an overriding fear that the Douhet theory was right and that workers would rebel leaving factories & cities when the first bombs fell! The official view was that the 'lower orders' had no stomach for it and were unreliable.

Fascinating material.

Danke

Keep 'em coming, Bomberguy!

brilliant! best on youtube!

Outstanding! Truly amazing footage.Particularly enjoyed the French bombers. A real treat. Thanks

Another gem.

Thanks again, Bomberguy. This is one of the best you have posted.